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IMPLEMENTING INTERNATIONAL ANTI-CORRUPTION STANDARDS TO
IMPROVE AFGHANISTAN’S EDUCATION SYSTEM
Adam J. Centner
Education is central to every country’s growth and sustainability,
but it is particularly important in a war-torn and developing nation like
Afghanistan. The education sector in Afghanistan has made drastic strides
since the overthrow of the Taliban government. Now, its biggest obstacle is
no longer the lack of students or funds, but rather the culture of corruption
that runs rampant in all aspects of Afghan life. From bribery to pilfered
paychecks, corruption destroys government credibility, wastes money, and
undermines the rule of law. This Note examines the United Nations
Convention Against Corruption and various international best practices to
investigate, prevent, prosecute, and educate against corruption. In
Afghanistan’s education sector, corruption will never be completely
eradicated, but it can be managed. Afghanistan’s future depends on it.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Afghanistan is at a pivotal moment. After decades of instability and
warfare, the future of this war-torn country relies on today’s policies and
initiatives. Involvement from both the Afghan government and the
international community is crucial.
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Education may be the most vital of these policies and initiatives.
Unfortunately, Afghanistan’s national education system is tragically
corrupt, depriving millions of school-aged children of the opportunity to
learn. Imagine being a teacher and having to pay a bribe for your paycheck.
Imagine being a parent and having to pay a bribe for your child to receive a
passing grade. Imagine being an employer and being unable to decipher
between the authentic diplomas and the counterfeit replicas.
Without suppressing the rampant corruption that currently plagues
Afghanistan, its educational goals will continue to go unmet, stripping the
country of its most vital resource: educated children. A poor education
system will severely cripple Afghanistan’s future growth and development,
both socially and economically. Education is only one part of an extremely
corrupt national governmental infrastructure in Afghanistan .1 In January
2010, Afghan President Hamid Karzai ordered all government ministries,
including the Ministry of Education (MoE), to devise detailed and
independent anti-corruption strategies.2
This Note will analyze how the United Nations Convention Against
Corruption (UNCAC) can be better implemented to reduce corruption in
Afghanistan’s education system. Specifically, it will discuss various anticorruption programs implemented in other countries and will consider how
Afghanistan’s MoE can benefit from the lessons learned and successes
achieved in the international community, as well as potential steps the MoE
can take to reduce corruption.
This Note is divided into three main parts. It begins with a glimpse
of the history of Afghanistan’s education system and its current state, as
well as the importance of a solid, functioning national education program,
particularly in such a war-torn and developing nation. Next, it examines the
impact that corruption has had on the education system and how it plays a
role in weakening the governmental infrastructure. This is followed by a
discussion of the United Nations Convention Against Corruption, as well as
current Afghan anti-corruption policies. This section also discusses ideas—
some already being implemented and some new—for battling corruption
1
See BOB WOODWARD, OBAMA’S WARS 218–19 (2010). It is well-documented that Afghanistan’s government, from top to bottom, is extraordinarily corrupt. U.S. Secretary of
Defense Robert Gates said Afghan President Hamid Karzai and his government are “way
beyond the pale in terms of corruption.” Id. at 219. U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan Karl
Eikenberry said that the international coalition led by the United States is “dealing with an
extraordinarily corrupt government.” Id. at 218.
2
Ministry of Education Drafts Anti-Corruption Policy, U.S. AGENCY FOR INT’L DEV.
(Mar. 15, 2010) [hereinafter MoE Drafts Policy], available at http://afghanistan.usaid.gov/en
/USAID/Article/1066/Ministry_of_Education_Drafts_Anticorruption_Policy. The Ministry
of Education drafted its anti-corruption policy throughout much of 2010. As of the date of
this Note, the policy is under review and not publicly available. Many have speculated, however, on the issues and solutions it will address, and much of that is discussed in this Note.
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within the education sector. Finally, the Note explores different potential
solutions for Afghanistan and the international community to take to reduce
the effect of corruption and stabilize the national education system.
II.

EDUCATION IN AFGHANISTAN

The importance of education in a society cannot be overstated. A
functioning and stable education system is a boon to progress, especially in
a struggling and transforming country. A core goal of Afghanistan’s MoE is
to develop a system that can serve as a cornerstone to peace, stability,
democracy, poverty reduction, and economic growth.3 A good education
program not only helps stabilize and grow a society, but it is also a key
ingredient in the fight against violent extremism.
A strong Afghanistan in the future requires a strong education
system today. The median age in Afghanistan is eighteen years: the country
has one of the youngest populations on the planet.4 It also has one of the
highest illiteracy rates in the world, with nearly three out of four people
unable to read or write.5 With this comes a vicious cycle: if so few members
of the population are literate, who is going to teach the children? Despite the
alarming numbers, though, Afghanistan’s education system has come a long
way in just ten years.
Education has never been particularly strong in Afghanistan, as
instability and religious priorities have made traditional schooling difficult.6
However, Afghanistan’s education system has never been as strong as it is
now, either. In the last century, Afghanistan’s education sector has
transformed from nonexistence into a developing infrastructure, then back
to near nonexistence. Today, it has become a rapidly growing, but still
flawed system. To understand how and why Afghanistan’s education
system is what it is today, it is important to start at the beginning.

3

Mohammad Haneef Atmar, Minister of Educ., Message from the Minister in MINISTRY
EDUC., ISLAMIC REPUB. AFG., NAT’L EDUCATION STRATEGIC PLAN FOR AFGHANISTAN:
1385–1389, at 9–10 (2007), available at http://www.iiep.unesco.org/fileadmin/user
_upload/News_And_Events/pdf/2010/Afghanistan_NESP.pdf. The late Richard Holbrooke, a
special advisor to President Barack Obama on Afghanistan, in a meeting with the president,
stressed that the United States should have three priorities in Afghanistan: agriculture, education, and reduction of poppies. WOODWARD, supra note 1, at 239.
4
The World Factbook: Afghanistan, CIA, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/theworld-factbook/geos/af.html (last updated May 8, 2012). The life expectancy in Afghanistan
is only slightly more than 44 years. Id.
5
Id.
6
See U.S. AGENCY FOR INT’L DEV., EDUCATION AND THE ROLE OF NGOS IN EMERGENCIES:
AFGHANISTAN 1978–2002, at 2–5 (2006) [hereinafter USAID] (describing the impact of the
Soviet occupation and later Taliban rule on education).
OF
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In 1904, the first government-supported boys school was built in
Kabul, Afghanistan;7 the first all-girls school was built in 1921.8 The
following year, Afghanistan’s MoE, still the entity overseeing national
education today, was created with the goal of building “a national system of
schools with a modern curriculum.”9 For years, Afghanistan seemed to be
on the right path: schools operated in every province, and additional schools
existed for the country’s nomadic population.10 Without question, there
were still not enough teachers, resources, or school buildings to
accommodate all of Afghanistan’s educational needs, but the progress was
undeniable.11
During this time, Afghanistan instituted more modernized laws,
including less-restrictive dress codes for women and equal rights for all.12
While this progressive reform was good for education, it also stirred up
opponents and it wasn’t long before the modernization came to a screeching
halt.13 In 1929, a change in government drastically altered Afghanistan’s
educational agenda: government schooling was considered “unreligious,”
leading children to become “infidels.”14 For the next twenty years, education
reform in Afghanistan went nowhere.
In the 1940s and 1950s, Afghanistan’s government renewed its
commitment to education. Education spending increased dramatically,

7

Id. at 2.
Mir Hekmatullah Sadat, Modern Education in Afghanistan, AFGHAN MAG. (Mar. 2004),
http://www.afghanmagazine.com/2004_03/articles/education.shtml. The first girls school
was created by Queen Soraya, whose mother served as the first principal. By 1928, the
school had educated more than 800 girls. In that same year, Afghanistan’s first coeducational elementary school opened. Though progress was being made at the elementary
level, no formal system existed for higher education and many top graduates were sent to
study in Egypt, Germany, and France. Id.
9
RICHARD NEWELL, THE POLITICS OF AFGHANISTAN 54 (1972).
10
Sadat, supra note 8.
11
See Afghanistan Education History, SCHOOL IS OPEN, http://www.schoolisopen.org/sio/
index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=53&Itemid=62 (last visited May 15,
2012) (explaining the expansion of an educational system during the mid-20th century, despite the challenges of changing government leadership and access to resources). Much of
the progress was made in the larger cities, especially Kabul. Though it was a good step for
Afghanistan, no formal schooling existed for many children living in remote villages. The
infrastructure was growing, but it was not yet at the point where the system could spread
throughout the country. Unfortunately, it would never get to that point in the 20th century. Id.
12
See BARRY YOUNGERMAN & SHAISTA WEBB, A BRIEF HISTORY OF AFGHANISTAN 106
(2007) (describing the advent of a new constitution in 1923, which, among other protections,
provided equal rights for non-Muslims and explicitly guaranteed women’s rights).
13
Id. at 109 (noting that uprisings against the government lead the king to dramatically
reverse course on his reform plans).
14
Sadat, supra note 8.
8
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eventually comprising more than 40% of the country’s national budget.15
Afghanistan sought assistance for education programs from international
organizations, including the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and
Cultural Organization (UNESCO) and several countries.16 While the
renewed focus was certainly positive, the numbers were still
underwhelming. By 1950, only 6% of children from age six to twelve were
enrolled in primary education.17
By the time the Soviet Union invaded in 1978, the gross enrollment
rate for all school-aged children attending classes had risen to 54% for
males and 12% for females.18 However, with the invasion came the fighting,
and in the next several decades an estimated 80% of the country’s school
buildings were destroyed.19 After the withdrawal of the Soviet Union in
1989, many expected education to improve, but the opposite occurred.20
After decades of war, the system was unable to grow, instead crumpling
from the continued fighting of different Mujahedeen factions grappling for
control, leading to the destruction of many more roads and schools.21
In 1996, the Taliban acquired control and quickly terminated all
modernized educational institutions in Afghanistan.22 The extremist
government banned girls from school and women from teaching, effectively
setting Afghanistan’s education system back almost a full century.23
When the Taliban government was officially overthrown in late
2001, there were less than one million school-aged children attending

15

Id.
See SAIF R. SAMADY, U.N. EDUC., SCI., & CULTURAL ORG., EDUCATION AND AFGHAN
SOCIETY IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 16 (2001) (describing UNESCO’s role in developing
education infrastructure and programs and other nation’s support for Afghan education via
advisory roles).
17
Sadat, supra note 8.
18
USAID, supra note 6, at 3. At this same time, the literacy rate was 18% for males and
5% for females. Sadat, supra note 8.
19
USAID, supra note 6, at 3.
20
See Leigh Nolan, Afghanistan, Education, and the Formation of the Taliban 18–20 (Jan.
2006) (unpublished M.A. thesis, Tufts University) (describing the failure of various antiSoviet factions to unite and provide any meaningful leadership after Soviet withdrawal).
During the Soviet era, there were two types of schools: pro-Soviet and anti-Soviet. The former created institutions designed to educate Afghan children on Communism and the Soviet
way of life. The anti-Soviet schools focused on traditional Afghan teachings. As time passed,
this branch became increasingly religious-based, focusing on Muslim teachings and preaching against foreign occupation. This extremist-type of schooling played a critical role in the
years following the Soviet withdrawal. Id. at 15–18.
21
See id. at 18–20
22
USAID, supra note 6, at 4.
23
Id.
16
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classes.24 Today, there are more than 6.8 million children enrolled in school,
including 2.5 million girls.25
Undoubtedly, Afghanistan’s education sector has seen many
tangible and impressive successes over the last decade. Yet roughly half of
the country’s school-aged children remain out of school. Only 25% of the
country’s approximately 160,000 teachers have a high school education,26
and even fewer are well versed in more than one subject and have the ability
to transfer that knowledge to the students: a recent survey found that only
ten out of 200 teachers (5%) could pass the exact same exam they were
giving their students.27
III. A WAY OF LIFE: CORRUPTION IN THE EDUCATION SECTOR
While education has vastly improved in the last several years, it still
has a long way to go. Unfortunately, systemic corruption threatens not only
the progress that has been made in the education system, but also the future
of Afghanistan itself.
For the purposes of this Note, corruption is defined as “the abuse of
trusted power for private gain.”28 Corruption in the government
compromises security, development and state building.29 In Afghanistan, it
is contributing to the deterioration of public confidence in the government
and the resurgence of the Taliban.30 In the education sector specifically,

24

GEORGE W. BUSH, DECISION POINTS 219 (2010). At this same time, there were only
3,400 school buildings, the majority of which were unusable, and 20,000 teachers. AGENCY
COORDINATING BODY FOR AFGHAN RELIEF, HEALTH AND EDUCATION IN AFGHANISTAN: AN
EMPTY GIFT 9 (2011) [hereinafter ACBAR].
25
ACBAR, supra note 24, at 9.
26
Ben Arnoldy, Big Test for Afghanistan Education, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Nov. 13,
2009), http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Asia-South-Central/2009/1113/p06s17-wosc.html.
27
OXFAM, FREE, QUALITY EDUCATION FOR EVERY AFGHAN CHILD 10 (2006), available at
http://www.oxfam.org/sites/www.oxfam.org/files/Free,%20Quality%20Education%20for%2
0Every%20Afghan%20Child.pdf.
28
Anti-Corruption FAQs, TRANSPARENCY INT’L, http://www.transparency.org/whoweare/
organisation/faqs_on_corruption/2/ (last visited May 15, 2012).
29
U.S. AGENCY FOR INT’L DEV., ASSESSMENT OF CORRUPTION IN AFGHANISTAN 1 (2009)
[hereinafter CORRUPTION ASSESSMENT]. In a report to then-President George W. Bush, Army
Lieutenant General Douglas Lute wrote that U.S. interests in Afghanistan hinge on three
goals: curtailing corruption, controlling the out-of-control opium trade, and destroying Taliban and al-Qaeda safe havens in Pakistan. WOODWARD, supra note 1, at 43–44. In July 2009,
General Stanley McChrystal echoed this sentiment, arguing that the military “could run the
finest counterinsurgency campaign in world history and still fail because of the weak and
corrupt Afghan government.” Id. at 151.
30
Dexter Filkins, Bribes Corrode Afghans’ Trust in Government, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 2,
2009, at A1. The article also noted quite eloquently, “From the lowliest traffic policeman to
the family of President Hamid Karzai, the state built on the ruins of the Taliban government
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corruption results in the payment of sixteen to twenty thousand ghost
teachers.31 In addition, teachers grade many students not on their own
performance or ability, but on arbitrary factors, including familial relations
and the family’s ability to pay a bribe.32 Largely due to their inadequate
salaries, many teachers rely on these bribes to feed their own families.33
Moreover, because of the poor organizational system and lack of
technology in the MoE, many teachers are not paid in a timely manner or
are forced to pay a bribe themselves to receive their own paycheck.34
Additionally, one cannot overlook the effect that corruption has directly on
children, especially when they grow up in an environment where corruption
is not only tolerated, but is a way of life. When it comes to implementing
anti-corruption programs, the battle lies in changing the culture of
corruption that undermines government at all levels. Theoretically, if
corruption is strongly condemned, public acceptance of corruption will
decline, thus establishing the beginning of a successful long-term, anticorruption strategy.
In addition to corruption’s direct effects on education, corruption
also deters and distorts private investment and erodes the functioning,
credibility, and legitimacy of the government.35 Transparency International,
an international watchdog organization that monitors corruption around the
globe, ranked Afghanistan as the third most corrupt country in the world in
2011, the most recent year for which data is available.36 Even worse, corrup-

seven years ago now often seems to exist for little more than the enrichment of those who
run it.” Id.
31
MORTEN SIGSGAARD, U.N. EDUC., SCI., AND CULTURAL ORG., EDUCATION AND
FRAGILITY IN AFGHANISTAN: A SITUATIONAL ANALYSIS 23 (2009). Ghost teachers are those
who do not show up to work but continue to collect a paycheck or those who are doubly
registered and collect two paychecks for a single job. Id.
32
See CORRUPTION ASSESSMENT, supra note 29, at 7 (describing how relationships among
individuals in the public and individuals in government have more authority than actual
government regulations).
33
Id. at 8.
34
See id. at 6 (explaining how the MoE is beginning to address how teachers must pay
bribes to receive pay checks and performance evaluations).
35
Asian Dev. Bank, U.K. Dep’t for Int’l Dev., U.N. Dev. Programme, U.N. Office on
Drugs and Crime & The World Bank, Fighting Corruption in Afghanistan: A Roadmap for
Strategy and Action 1 (Discussion Draft, Feb. 16, 2007), available at http://www.unodc.org/
pdf/afg/anti_corruption_roadmap.pdf.
36
TRANSPARENCY INT’L, CORRUPTION PERCEPTIONS INDEX (2012). Afghanistan was tied
for third worst with Myanmar; the essentially government-less Somalia was rated the world’s
most corrupt country. Transparency International ranked 182 nations based on the perception
of corruption in the public sector. The results reflect a compilation of several (four in Afghanistan) relevant surveys and assessments from reputable international institutions and
watch-groups. Afghanistan received an Index score of 1.5. By comparison, New Zealand
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tion continues to grow: the same Transparency International survey in 2005
ranked Afghanistan 117th out of 180 countries, and more recently has
plummeted to 180th out of 182 countries.37 A 2010 survey found that 15% of
Afghans believe the MoE is one of the three most corrupt public institutions
in the country, up from 12% in 2007.38 Additionally, 10% of Afghans
surveyed said that corruption deprived them or their children of a primary or
secondary education.39 While paying bribes for an education is not as
common as paying for police or court services, the bribes paid to obtain
educational services were usually among the highest.40 For the households
that paid education bribes, the average amount paid was 10,925 Afs per
year, about U.S. $218.41
Why does corruption occur in the education system? First, it is
important to note that in just over a decade the number of children attending
schools in Afghanistan has increased from about one million to almost
seven million, and the number of teachers has jumped from 20,000 to
160,000.42 These increases would be quite significant for any system to
absorb, but they are particularly cumbersome in an already weak
infrastructure. Moreover, in a more-developed nation, where technological
tools are more readily available, the strains of such an enrollment increase
might not be as harsh. However, in Afghanistan, most teachers and schools,
and certainly the MoE, lack the ability to update quickly. For example, until
recently the government paid all teacher salaries in cash. As one would
expect, this process had several steps, with money flowing from the MoE to
provincial offices to district offices to individual schools and finally to the
individual teacher.43 It was not uncommon for the intermediaries to siphon
claimed the top spot for the least corrupt country with an Index score of 9.5, followed by
Denmark and Finland with scores of 9.4. Id.
37
Id.
38
INTEGRITY WATCH AFG., AFGHAN PERCEPTIONS AND EXPERIENCES OF CORRUPTION: A
NATIONAL SURVEY 30 (2010). Interestingly, several public institutions, including the Ministry of Interior, banks, courts, and municipalities decreased in their perceived level of corruption. Id. The largest difference occurred in the Courts, where 53% of Afghans rated them one
of the most corrupt in 2007, but only 18% held the same view in 2010. Id. The Ministry of
Justice and Ministry of Defense were the largest increases in perceived corruption, raising 13
and 16 points, respectively, between 2007 and 2010. Id.
39
Id. at 64–65. The same survey also found that 76% of Afghans felt they had not been
deprived of education because of a corrupt government, while 13% were unsure. Id.
40
Id. at 68.
41
Id. By comparison, the average bribe for other public services is U.S. $160. In 2009, the
U.N. estimated that Afghans paid U.S. $2.5 billion in bribes across the board, equaling almost 23% of the country’s GDP and making corruption the second largest income generator
in Afghanistan behind only the opium trade. U.N. OFFICE ON DRUGS AND CRIME,
CORRUPTION IN AFGHANISTAN: BRIBERY AS REPORTED BY THE VICTIMS 4 (2010).
42
Arnoldy, supra note 26.
43
CORRUPTION ASSESSMENT, supra note 29, at 41.
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off money at each step.44 The MoE has recently improved its direct-deposit
system for teachers, thereby allowing money to go straight from the
Ministry into individual bank accounts.45 However, these advancements
have only been accessible to teachers in larger cities, particularly Kabul.46
Many teachers in outlying villages and regions don’t have access to this
type of technology, or even bank accounts.47
The incentives to solicit bribers are particularly great for teachers.
Afghanistan’s teachers are some of the lowest paid in the world, making
approximately U.S. $100 per month.48 Couple this with the fact that there is
minimal oversight and accountability, it is apparent that teachers have little
to fear and much to gain through bribery.
Additionally, the MoE lacks information regarding teachers. This is
due to the influx of new teachers and the MoE’s inability to keep up in the
past decade, evidenced by the number of ghost teachers in the country and
the Ministry’s general lack of knowledge about many of its educators.49
IV. A GLOBAL SOLUTION TO A GLOBAL PROBLEM: THE UNITED NATIONS
CONVENTION AGAINST CORRUPTION
Corruption only occurs when a public official expects to derive a
net positive benefit from the transaction. Accordingly, a successful anti44

Id.
Id.
46
Id. According to USAID, the agency is currently working with the Central Bank of
Afghanistan, to develop direct deposit systems for the military and police. Id. When resources become more readily available, the agency hopes to expand this program to more
civil servants in non-urban areas. See also Faster Payment for Afghan Civil Servants, U.S.
AGENCY FOR INT’L DEV. (May 15, 2010), http://afghanistan.usaid.gov/en/USAID/ Article/1166/Faster_Payment_for_Afghan_Civil_Servants.
47
See The World Bank, Afghanistan Public Expenditure Review 2010: Education Sector
11–12 (The World Bank, Working Paper No. 5, 2010), available at http://siteresources.
worldbank.org/AFGHANISTANEXTN/Resources/305984-1264608805475/6739619-12768
13833351/Paper5.pdf (noting that challenges remain in streamlining direct deposit for teachers). One of the steps the MoE is taking to combat corruption and low wages is to require
teachers to open bank accounts. While this is not a problem for some, others must travel long
distances to do so, which would also require them to travel to collect their paychecks. Abbas
Daiyar, Teacher’s Day in Afghanistan, KABUL PERSPECTIVE BLOG, (May 23, 2009, 10:09
PM), http://www.kabulperspective.wordpress.com/2009/05/23/teachers-day-in-afghanistan/.
48
Arnoldy, supra note 26.
49
Cf. Jonathon Burch, Afghan Census Postponed for Two Years: UN, REUTERS (June 8,
2008), http://www.reuters.com/article/2008/06/08/us-afghan-census-idUSISL267420080608
(noting that policy makers have insufficient and unreliable data and therefore struggle to
properly allocate government funds and international aid). In 2008, the country’s first census
since 1979 was postponed due to poor security and the potential of the 2009 presidential
election politicizing the event and jeopardizing its statistical integrity. The census was rescheduled for 2010, but at the time of this Note, no census statistics were available. Id.
45
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corruption program would lower the expected gains and raise the expected
penalties of corrupt behavior. If the costs—or potential costs—were to
outweigh the expected gain, officials would be hesitant to engage in corruption. In an attempt to combat such a global problem and alter the costbenefit calculations that may favor corruption, the international community
has devised a multi-faceted framework to target corruption at its roots and
punish those who engage in it.
The United Nations Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC) was
entered into force on December 14, 2005, and is the first and only legally
binding international anti-corruption treaty.50 UNCAC acknowledges the
negative effects of corruption, noting that corruption leads to human rights
violations, distorts markets, allows organized crime and terrorism to
flourish, and undermines democracy and the rule of law.51 Afghanistan
signed the Convention in 2004 and ratified it in August 2008.52 This was a
significant step for Afghanistan, but much remains to be done.
The Convention’s stated goals are:
(a) [t]o promote and strengthen measures to prevent and combat
corruption more efficiently and effectively;
(b) [t]o promote, facilitate and support international cooperation and
technical assistance in the prevention of and fight against corruption,
including in asset recovery; and
(c) [t]o promote integrity, accountability and proper management of public
affairs and public property.53

50
The Global Compact and the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, U.N. GLOBAL
COMPACT, http://www.unglobalcompact.org/ParticipantsAndStakeholders/un_agencies/Unit
ed_Nations_Office_on_Drugs.html (last visited May 16, 2012).
51
Kofi Annan, U.N. Secretary-General, Foreword to U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime,
U.N. Convention Against Corruption (2004), available at http://www.unodc.org/documents/
treaties/UNCAC/Publications/Convention/08-50026_E.pdf.
52
SPECIAL INSPECTOR GEN. FOR AFG. RECONSTRUCTION, U.S. RECONSTRUCTION EFFORTS IN
AFGHANISTAN WOULD BENEFIT FROM A FINALIZED COMPREHENSIVE U.S. ANTI-CORRUPTION
STRATEGY 2 (2010) [hereinafter FINALIZED STRATEGY], available at http://www.sigar.mil/
pdf/audits/2010-08-05audit-10-15.pdf.
53
U.N. Convention Against Corruption, G.A. Res 58/4, U.N. Doc. A/RES/58/4, Annex,
art. 1 (Oct. 31, 2003) [hereinafter UNCAC]. The Convention has 140 signatories. United
Nations Convention Against Corruption, U.N. OFFICE ON DRUGS AND CRIME, http://www.
unodc.org/unodc/en/treaties/CAC/signatories.html (last visited May 16, 2012). It is lauded in
the international community for being the first international anti-corruption instrument with
an asset recovery provision, often considered a key ingredient lacking in other anticorruption strategies. See Philippa Webb, The United Nations Convention Against Corruption, 8 J. INT’L ECON. L. 191, 206–12 (describing the focus on asset recovery during UNCAC
drafting and debates).
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To meet these ends, UNCAC relies on four pillars: prevention,
criminalization, international cooperation, and asset recovery.54 Combating
corruption in the education sector cannot focus solely on the education
sector. It is not possible to rid one Ministry of corruption while it occurs in
epidemic proportions throughout the rest of the government. Accordingly,
adhering to the provisions of UNCAC will enable Afghanistan to strive for
and achieve four main goals in combating corruption: (1) improving
transparency and accountability in government institutions; (2) improving
financial oversight; (3) building judicial capacity to investigate, prosecute,
punish, and remove corrupt officials; and (4) aiding organizations in
educating and empowering the public to participate in good governance.55
Accomplishing these four goals will greatly reduce corruption in
Afghanistan, and UNCAC is the first international convention to establish a
comprehensive framework for doing just that.
A.

Prevention: Ending the Culture of Corruption

The first pillar, prevention, is a comprehensive set of requirements
aimed not only at deterring corruption before it occurs, but also at changing
the culture of corruption in a society through transparency and public
participation.56 Afghanistan has recently established three organizations to
prevent, investigate, and prosecute corruption: (1) the High Office of
Oversight and Anti-Corruption (HOOAC); (2) the Major Crimes Task Force
(MCTF); and (3) the Anti-Corruption Unit (ACU).
The HOOAC, discussed in detail below, is the unifying
organization tasked with overseeing the government-wide anti-corruption
efforts, including complaint follow-up, investigation, and coordination
among agencies.57 The MCTF is a unit comprised of 163 agents and is
responsible for investigating cases of high-level corruption.58 Unfortunately,
54

UNCAC, supra note 53, arts. 5, 15, 43, 51.
FINALIZED STRATEGY, supra note 52, at 3–4.
56
See UNCAC, supra note 53, arts. 5–14 (outlining the preventative measures and roles of
public and private officials and institutions in preventing and fighting corruption).
57
SPECIAL INSPECTOR GEN. FOR AFG. RECONSTRUCTION, ANTI-CORRUPTION REPORT TO THE
UNITED STATES CONGRESS 108 (Jan. 30, 2011) [hereinafter SIGAR REP’T], available at
http://www.sigar.mil/pdf/quarterlyreports/2011-01-30qr.pdf (discussing the various Afghan
bodies charged with implementing the Afghan anti-corruption movement and the progress
that they have made).
58
Id. at 108–09. The MCTF receives logistical support from the FBI and mentoring support from the Department of Justice. According to the U.S. Bureau of International Narcotics
and Law Enforcement Affairs, the MCTF is operating at 70% capacity. President Karzai
undermined its credibility when he ordered that the task force be investigated for illegal
activities and human rights violations following the arrest of one of his aides. Subsequently,
two lead prosecutors involved in the investigation and arrest were transferred to a provincial
office. Id.
55

858

CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L.

[Vol. 44:847

the MCTF has little involvement in the education system and focuses
largely on high-level officials in the national government: its investigations
have led to very few prosecutions.59 Lastly, the ACU operates in the Afghan
Attorney General’s Office and oversees prosecution of corruption cases.60 In
the final quarter of 2010, the ACU secured eight convictions of mid-level
officials, but it has not pursued prosecution of high-level government
employees.61 In a clear sign of the government’s reluctance to rigorously
root out corruption within its ranks, the Attorney General and the Afghan
Supreme Court issued directives forbidding the use of polygraphs on newly
hired anti-corruption officials.62 While the ACU hired fifty new prosecutors
between July 2010 and January 2011, it did not subject any of these
individuals to polygraph testing, and only five of the eleven judges on the
Anti-Corruption Tribunal have taken and passed a polygraph examination.63
In implementing each entity and its functions, Afghanistan has
increasingly relied on UNCAC’s provisions. The Convention’s initial step
in combating corruption is to establish a body to oversee all aspects of the
anti-corruption program within a government.64 Likely out of fear that an
anti-corruption body is susceptible to the same temptations that plague
government officials and public employees, UNCAC requires the
government to give to the body the necessary independence and freedom to
carry out its broad array of tasks without undue influence.65
In fulfilling this obligation, President Karzai created HOOAC, a
promising organization designed to provide unifying oversight to
coordinate, supervise, and support all anti-corruption programs within
Afghanistan.66 The President appoints the top officer of HOOAC, the
59

Id. at 109.
Id.
61
Id. Until July 2010, officials from the U.S. Department of Justice provided full-time
assistance to ACU prosecutors. However, this partnership was terminated in July because of
efforts by Karzai to undermine the prosecution of a presidential aide. The DOJ has since
reinstated the mentoring program, but is only permitted by the Afghan government to work
on a limited number of mid-level cases. SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR AFGHANISTAN
RECONSTRUCTION, ANTI-CORRUPTION REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS 92–93 (July
30, 2011), available at http://www.sigar.mil/pdf/quarterlyreports/2011-07-30qr.pdf.
62
SIGAR REP’T, supra note 57, at 109.
63
Id.
64
UNCAC, supra note 53, art. 6, ¶ 1.
65
Id. art. 6, ¶. 2.,
66
HIGH OFFICE OF OVERSIGHT AND ANTI-CORRUPTION, ANTI-CORRUPTION STRATEGIC
PLAN: 2011–2013, at 6 (2010) [hereinafter HOOAC STRATEGIC PLAN], available at https://
www.pksoi.org/document_repository/doc_lib/HOO_Anti-Corruption_Strategic_Plan_20112013.pdf. In December 2010, HOOAC released a 60-page anti-corruption strategy detailing
what it expects to accomplish by 2013. Id. This is a great start, but clearly missing from the
strategy is an individualized approach to each Ministry. The MoE is only mentioned a handful of times, largely in regard to weaving anti-corruption education into the curriculum of
60
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Director General.67 Its mandate includes oversight of all administrative and
preventative measures against corruption undertaken by individual
ministries, as well as investigation and prosecution of citizen complaints.68
While HOOAC’s concept and goals are a significant start, more is
necessary. HOOAC would do well to serve as an umbrella organization,
perhaps coordinating all sectors in an anti-corruption strategy, as it is
expected to do. However, combating the kind of corruption that is rampant
in Afghanistan will not be accomplished by one large government oversight
organization.69
It is important to remember that Afghanistan is a society in which
truckers pay bribes to get from Point A to Point B, citizens pay bribes to
settle lawsuits, homeowners pay bribes to acquire the title to their home,
and parents pay bribes to ensure passing grades for their children.
Corruption is so entrenched and common that a single organization cannot
be expected to oversee and reform the entire government, particularly when
the organization is grossly understaffed and undertrained.70 The U.N. Office
on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), which provides assistance to member states
on the implementation of their obligations under UNCAC, has
acknowledged that HOOAC lacks key infrastructure, staffing, and technical
assistance.71 Considering this acknowledgement alongside HOOAC’s broad,
daunting mandate, HOOAC risks becoming obsolete. During its first year,
primary and secondary schools. See, e.g., id. at 27, 47. A more narrow approach is necessary
in the education system to achieve real and lasting progress.
67
Introduction: Who We Are?, HIGH OFFICE OF OVERSIGHT AND ANTI-CORRUPTION,
http://anti-corruption.gov.af/en/page/1733 (last visited May 16, 2012).
68
See HOOAC STRATEGIC PLAN, supra note 66, at 19–26 (describing the policies, objectives, and scope of the projects at HOOAC).
69
ISLAMIC REPUB. AFG., STRATEGY AND POLICY FOR ANTI-CORRUPTION AND
ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM 7 (2009) [hereinafter SPACAR], available at http://anticorruption.gov.af/Content/files/ANTI%20CURAPTION%20STRATIGY_Eng.pdf (calling
for more than just government oversight to fight corruption). Among a number of external
factors blamed for facilitating corruption, “unsound performances of detection and investigation organizations” was identified as a primary reason Afghanistan’s culture of corruption
remains so prevalent. The report noted that police and investigative agencies often delay or
botch the process, then preventing the judicial system from sanctioning the perpetrator. Id. at
85.
70
HOOAC STRATEGIC PLAN, supra note 66, at 12. HOOAC represents a shift from stopping current corruption to deterring and preventing future corruption, and aims to do so by
investigating individual corruption cases. Unfortunately, corruption is so rife that it occurs in
almost every business transaction, so investigations by one organization would almost certainly go nowhere in the long run, as the demand would be too high to have an impact. Id. at
14.
71
U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime, Anti-Corruption Measures in Afghanistan 1 (unpublished Concept Note, Jan. 2010), available at http://www.unodc.org/documents
/afghanistan//conceptnotes/Microsoft_Word_-_2010_11_April_01_Concept_Note_AntiCorruption.pdf [hereinafter UNODC Anti-Corruption Measures].
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HOOAC installed public drop boxes, established a hotline to collect complaints, and assisted various ministries in the creation of their own anticorruption strategies.72 Nonetheless, perhaps in a sign that the organization
is over-stretched, it led only one high-profile arrest and sent only fifteen
cases to law-enforcement agencies.73
Instead, Afghanistan should create a separate organization within
the MoE to identify and focus on corruption as it occurs within that realm,
unified under the umbrella organization of HOOAC and in cooperation with
the other anti-corruption organizations.74 This would allow for a much
narrower mandate, focusing only on corruption as it occurs in the education
sector. Ideally, it should be a boots-on-the-ground, in-your-face
organization that would publicly march against corruption. By becoming
more involved than drop boxes and hotlines, the organization could more
easily cater to the citizens and could establish a presence, hopefully
diminishing the public’s acceptance of bribery and corrupt practices. A
visible organization would almost certainly enhance pressure on those
responsible and provide more transparency to those concerned.
This organization must also be largely independent of government
influence. A significant concern with HOOAC is that it reports directly to
President Karzai, a man whom many believe contributes heavily to the
worsening culture of corruption in Afghanistan.75 In response to
72
Ben Arnoldy, The Man Leading Afghanistan’s Anti-Corruption Fight, CHRISTIAN
SCIENCE MONITOR (Nov. 16, 2009) [hereinafter Anti-Corruption Fight], http://www
.csmonitor.com/World/Asia-South-Central/2009/1116/p06s07-wosc.html. HOOAC has also
developed a system to seek out complaints and then distribute all information to the relevant
ministry. While this is a good start, this is the exact type of on-the-ground operation that a
smaller organization, focusing only on the education sector, should be conducting. It would
allow for greater independence and establish conduits through which people may report
corruption and receive immediate response, rather than filtering from HOOAC down to the
MoE for further investigation. Even with HOOAC, the organization only collects complaints,
leaving the ministries to address them and enforce any remedies, providing only an additional unnecessary step and further bureaucracy. See CORRUPTION ASSESSMENT, supra note 29, at
15 (discussing the split between HOOAC’s investigatory authority and the individual ministries’ enforcement authorities).
73
Anti-Corruption Fight, supra note 72.
74
Though it might seem that HOOAC and the other organizations working together would
be sufficient to combat corruption in the education system, it is not. All of the organizations
are grossly untrained, understaffed, and unfunded, and they all are designed to root out the
most common and blatant forms of corruption. Corruption that is unique to an individual
ministry requires a more narrow and hands-on approach to focus on diminishing it within
that realm. See, e.g., UNODC Anti-Corruption Measures, supra note 71, at 3 (proposing
further anti-corruption efforts focus on localized level).
75
See Adam Entous, Pentagon Puts Pressure on Hamid Karzai Over Corruption,
REUTERS (Mar. 29, 2010), http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/03/29/us-afghanistan-usamullen-idUSTRE62S0BG20100329 (describing U.S. efforts to convince Karzai to do more
to fight corruption). Karzai’s brother, Ahmad Wali Karzai, was the top provincial official in
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Afghanistan’s 2009 election fraud and renewed calls by the international
community to confront corruption, Karzai has pledged to do just that.76
However, there is also sufficient evidence to show that Karzai is merely
giving lip service to an issue that has received increased attention,
particularly as he has weakened anti-corruption investigations and condoned
the culture of impunity in some instances.77
The creation and goals of HOOAC are commendable and a strong
first step. This body will lead the entire government in its anti-corruption
agenda, but it should not be considered a silver bullet. A narrower approach
to education would likely be more effective in Afghanistan. The creation of
a body within the MoE would allow for a more customized approach to
fighting corruption as it occurs in the education sector, and it would limit
the scope of complaints, investigations, and prosecutions.
The Hong Kong Independent Commission Against Corruption
(ICAC) is a good example of the type of comprehensive, independent, and
successful organization that a MoE anti-corruption body should strive to
become. When Hong Kong established the ICAC in 1974, corruption in
Hong Kong was so widespread and accepted that many dismissed the new
organization.78 However, the ICAC garnered almost-immediate legitimacy
after the prosecution of 247 government officials.79 While Afghanistan and

Kandahar and considered by many to be the cause of much corruption, particularly related to
the opium trade. American officials have anonymously spoken out against Wali Karzai,
going as far as saying U.S. interests would rather him be out of the government. Id. After the
initial writing of this Note, Ahmad Wali Karzai was assassinated in July 2011 by a longtime
confidant. Alissa J. Rubin & Scott Shane, Assassination in Afghanistan Creates a Void, N.Y.
TIMES, July 13, 2011, at A1.
76
UNODC Anti-Corruption Measures, supra note 71, at 1. In his second inaugural speech,
Karzai pledged his commitment to fight corruption and end the culture of impunity. He also
created HOOAC, tasked the body to organize national anti-corruption conferences, and ordered all government ministries to perform their own anti-corruption strategies. Id. While
this has been completed by the MoE, the draft is currently under review and has not yet been
released. MoE Drafts Policy, supra note 2.
77
See Richard Spencer, Karzai Seeks to Weaken Anti-Corruption Investigations in Afghanistan, TELEGRAPH, (Sept. 9, 2010), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/
afghanistan/7991297/Karzai-seeks-to-weaken-anti-corruption-investigations-in-Afghanistan.
html. After the United States invested more resources into assisting anti-corruption investigations, including teams from the FBI and Treasury Department, Karzai insisted on less involvement by foreign officials and more local Afghan control, a move critics say weakens
the investigations and relies solely on inept or unwilling officials. Id.
78
See Tony Kwok Man-Wai, Formulating an Effective Anti-Corruption Strategy: The
Experience of Hong Kong ICAC, in ANNUAL REPORT FOR 2005 AND RESOURCE MATERIAL
SERIES NO. 69, at 196 (2006) (noting that few people in Hong Kong believed ICAC would be
successful).
79
Id. In 2000, Hong Kongers ranked the creation and success of ICAC as the sixth most
important event in Hong Kong history. Id. In 2010, the Transparency International Corrup-
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Hong Kong differ significantly, there are still similarities and lessons to be
learned from the creation and implementation of such a successful
organization. Most importantly, in both countries corruption is—or was—
systemic, both at the highest levels of government and throughout the
system.80 In Hong Kong, police officers were regarded as the largest part of
the problem, whereas in Afghanistan, teachers and MoE administrators are
often to blame.
To accomplish its mandate, ICAC has three overarching departments: (1) Operations, (2) Corruption Prevention, and (3) Community
Relations.81 The Operations Department exposes and investigates corruption
through the use of undercover operations and complaint follow-up. ICAC
receives complaints through a report center and hotline number, and an
ICAC agent investigates each complaint and has authority to arrest suspects
upon evidence that a corrupt transaction has occurred.82
ICAC’s Corruption Prevention Department is charged with
providing anti-corruption recommendations and conducting studies to
determine where the corruption is most active and harmful.83 By law,
ICAC’s Commissioner must relay his or her findings from the studies to
public sector organizations, and he or she must make recommendations on
the effective implementation of corruption prevention mechanisms to both
public organizations and to any requesting member of the public.84
Lastly, ICAC’s Community Relations Department is responsible for
educating the public about the evils of corruption.85 One of the most critical
functions of an oversight body is the enhancement of transparency
throughout the government and individual ministries, from conducting
corruption investigations to providing education statistics and financial data.
UNCAC refers several times to the importance of transparency, particularly
in allowing the public to see and participate in the decision-making
tion Perception Index ranked Hong Kong as the 13th best country (13 out of 178) with an
Index score of 8.4. TRANSPARENCY INT’L, supra note 36.
80
JOHN R. HEILBRUNN, INT’L BANK FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND DEV., ANTI-CORRUPTION
COMMISSIONS: PANACEA OR REAL MEDICINE TO FIGHT CORRUPTION? 3 (2004).
81
Presentation by Andrew H.Y. Wong, Dir. of Admin., ICAC, Anti-Corruption Strategy
of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People’s Republic of China (Dec.
2003), available at http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/apcity/unpan
019145.pdf.
82
INFO. SERVS. DEP’T, HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMIN. REGION GOV’T, HONG KONG: THE
FACTS: ICAC (Apr. 2011). Between its creation in 1974 and the end of 2010, ICAC received
108,389 corruption complaints, conducted 70,511 investigations, and prosecuted 13,808
persons. Id.
83
Id.
84
Id.
85
Id.
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processes of government.86 This could range from publicizing funding and
tracking where money goes, to publicizing the names of those officials
caught soliciting bribes or otherwise engaging in corrupt business
transactions. Corruption thrives in secrecy; maximizing transparency where
possible can only serve to deter corruption.
ICAC’s Community Relations Department not only disseminates
anti-corruption messages to the public, but it also is tasked with ensuring
that ICAC remains a transparent and responsive organization, which it
accomplishes largely through the use of an ICAC website and various
training programs intended to encourage integrity among civil servants.87
Afghanistan can take similar measures. While many anti-corruption
programs aim to educate the public on the negative consequences of
corruption, the MoE has firsthand access to a key demographic: children.
The MoE anti-corruption body should work to communicate with the
general public through training programs, seminars, and mass media, but it
should also incorporate anti-corruption lessons and discussions into the
general school curriculum. When corruption is as common and destructive
as it is in Afghanistan, educating children against it is a critical objective.
A key difference between HOOAC and ICAC—and a critical factor
in the success of the organizations—is the number of staff members. ICAC
has a staff of almost 1,400.88 By comparison, HOOAC’s Complaints
Management and Review, Prevention, and Community Relations
departments have a total of sixty-five positions, thirty-three of which are
currently vacant.89 Though HOOAC’s structure is similar to that of ICAC, it
is vastly understaffed and lacks the resources it needs to achieve ICAC-type
success. Instead, the smaller MoE anti-corruption body should be created
with a similar structure. Its focused mandate would allow it to operate on a
smaller budget with fewer agents.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, ICAC is successful because
of its independent structure.90 Collectively, the departments answer to a
Commissioner who in turn answers directly to the Chief Executive of the
Hong Kong Special Administrative Region.91 Most critical, however, are the
checks and balances that are incorporated into the system. Five independent
committees closely scrutinize the ICAC, each consisting of leading and non86

UNCAC, supra note 53, art. 7, 10, 13 (emphasizing transparency in public sector services, public reporting, and in dealings with society).
87
INFO. SERVS. DEP’T, supra note 82.
88
Id.
89
See HOOAC STRATEGIC PLAN, supra note 66, at 20, 24, 27 (providing the number of
people on staff and number of vacancies for each department).
90
See INFO. SERVS. DEP’T, supra note 82 (stating that ICAC is independent of the civil
service and describing the independent committees that oversee ICAC’s work).
91
Id.
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official citizens: the Advisory Committee on Corruption advises on
Commission-wide policies and issues; the Operations Review Committee
monitors all ICAC investigations; the Corruption Prevention Advisory
Committee supervises the Commission’s efforts to improve practices and
procedures; the Citizens Advisory Committee on Community Relations
supervises and makes recommendations regarding ICAC’s engagement with
the public; and the Complaints Committee examines public complaints
against ICAC and its staff.92 With so many different and independent bodies
overseeing the operation of ICAC, its independence is assured. The MoE’s
anti-corruption body must take similar steps to ensure its integrity and
dedication to anti-corruption efforts. Unless it establishes a comprehensive
system of checks and balances, the body risks becoming another puppet of
the already corrupt government.
One risk associated with creating a smaller, more focused
organization is the competition for funds and coordination—or lack of—that
might occur between the smaller organization and the HOOAC. Funding is
discussed below, but the advantages of an organization, most notably the
corruption-related investigations within only the MoE, outweigh the
complications caused by the additional agency. Ultimately, the organization
could save money by more specifically targeting anti-corruption efforts to
achieve the desired results within the MoE.
Outside of an administrative anti-corruption body, the Convention
also requires Afghanistan to maintain and strengthen systems for recruiting,
hiring, and retaining civil servants, including teachers.93 The Convention
aims not just to attack corruption as it occurs, but it also tries to remedy the
root causes of corruption.
Central to any anti-corruption mechanism is the notion that selfinterested individuals will seek out and accept bribes, and that they will
engage in corrupt business practices if the expected gains outweigh the
potential costs.94 The Afghan government could influence this cost-benefit
consideration by promoting adequate remuneration and equitable pay
scales.95 Much has been made of Afghanistan’s teachers’ low salaries—
some of the lowest in the world—along with paychecks being late and
officials bribed for teachers to receive them. Confronting the issue of
teacher payment is more complex than it may seem.
92

Id.
UNCAC, supra note 53, art. 7, ¶ 1. The Convention also notes that these systems should
be based on efficiency, transparency, merit, equity, and aptitude. Id.
94
Jeff Huther & Anwar Shah, Anti-Corruption Policies and Programs: A Framework for
Evaluation 3 (The World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 2501, 2000).
95
See UNCAC, supra note 53, art. 7, ¶ 1(c) (presenting pay scales as a means to strengthen accountability among public officials).
93
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First and foremost, Afghanistan must increase teacher salaries over
the next several years. The MoE has begun this process by increasing
salaries from $100 per month to a range of $120 to $428 per month, and it is
critical that this pay raise continue for several reasons.96 To start, teachers
making more money will not have to rely as heavily on bribes to feed their
families and to make ends meet. Further, the higher the relative salaries for
teachers, the more he or she risks losing if caught engaging in corruption,
and low salaries in the public sector tend to attract lower-level applicants,
resulting in less competent employees.97 Additionally, teachers comprise
two-thirds of the civil servants in Afghanistan; when teachers are paid well
and happy, they translate that success to their students and promote respect
for and understanding of the law. And when civil servants are paid very
little, the moral cost of corruption is reduced; poorly paid teachers might
find it less reprehensible to accept bribes.98 This is particularly true in
Afghanistan, where there is very little, if any, moral condemnation in
requesting or paying a bribe.
Second, education needs to be professionalized. In 2010, the MoE
took significant steps in doing so by opening forty-two teacher-training
colleges throughout the country.99 This program not only certifies and
registers teachers, but also serves as an anti-corruption mechanism by
promoting a more professional work environment and adhering to a strict
code of conduct. This process will immediately cut down on the number of
ghost teachers and allow the MoE to more accurately allocate funds and
resources to the villages and provinces in need. With the increased number
of teachers and a more professionalized work environment, the MoE will
also be able to raise its hiring standards.100
96

Arnoldy, supra note 26. The pay scale is based on the teacher’s level of education and
their score on a national standardized test. Unfortunately, limited funding has hampered the
government’s efforts to increase teacher pay and international donors have been reluctant to
contribute because of the problems arising from corruption, lack of security, etc. Id.
97
CHR. MICHELSEN INST., CORRUPTION IN THE EDUCATION SECTOR 10 (2006).
98
Id.
99
Press Release, ISAF Pub. Affairs Office, Progress in Afghanistan Highlighted by Business Growth, Job Creation and New Infrastructure Projects (Nov. 4, 2010), available at
http://www.centcom.mil/press-releases/progress-in-afghanistan-highlighted-by-businessgrowth-job-creation-and-new-infrastructure-projects. The training colleges offer certification
programs to certify Afghans as professional teachers. This is a substantial step toward improving teacher quality throughout the country. As of late 2010, these colleges had graduated
more than 123,000 teachers from the short-term course and another 20,000 from the teacherin-training two-year program. Sgt. Shawn Coolman, Lashkar Gah TTC Educates Future
Afghan Teachers, DVIDS NEWS (Oct. 7, 2010), http://www.dvidshub.net/news/57732/ lashkar-gah-ttc-educates-future-afghan-teachers#.T7XJp3lYtuQ.
100
Arnoldy, supra note 26. Understandably, shortly after the fall of the Taliban, teachers
were in such dire need that the MoE could not afford to set high standards. However, as the
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Another step the MoE can take is the development of direct deposit
systems that will allow a teacher’s paycheck to be deposited directly into a
bank account. A World Bank working policy paper argues that reducing the
number of transactions involving public officials is a significant mechanism
in influencing cost-benefit considerations and reducing corruption.101 Direct
deposit systems would immediately achieve this by not only cutting down
the time it takes to send the money, but also reducing the number of hands
that have access to the money. One common problem with this approach,
however, is that many teachers, particularly those in rural and distant
villages, do not have easy access to a bank.102 In 2009, the MoE instituted a
new system requiring some teachers to register, open a bank account, and
take a competency test.103 Without a doubt, there are problems with this
method, particularly because many teachers lack easy access to banks. But
despite these problems, this type of system should be instituted throughout
the country, as it would allow the Ministry to collect data, distribute
payment more easily, and weed out unqualified teachers.104 These types of
preventative measures would allow the MoE to crack down on ghost
teachers and more effectively provide resources—financial and otherwise—
to teachers and schools throughout the country.
B.

Criminalization: Finally Enforcing the Laws

Criminalization is the second pillar of UNCAC.105 The Convention
requires states to criminalize the offering or giving of a bribe to a public
system continues to develop, the MoE can begin implementing more appropriate standards,
including education requirements, mandatory training classes, registration systems, etc. Id.
101
Huther & Shah, supra note 94, 3–4. The other mechanisms include reducing the scope
for gains from each transaction, increasing the probability of paying a penalty, and increasing
the penalty from corrupt behavior. Id.
102
Daiyar, supra note 47. On his blog, one journalist wrote of the problems many teachers
have faced. Because many are “untrained and non-professional,” he said, they have no bank
account and often find themselves traveling long distances to get to the bank before waiting
all day to open an account and receive their paycheck. Id.
103
CORRUPTION ASSESSMENT, supra note 29, at 19, 41. The Ministry’s goal was to establish
teacher in-service training throughout the country by attaining a 70% competency rating for
all teachers by the end of 2011. Mohammed Haneef Atmar, Minister of Education, Education
Sector Strategy for the Afghanistan National Development Strategy 1 (Ministry of Educ.,
Draft, Mar. 2007).
104
See CORRUPTION ASSESSMENT, supra note 29, at 19 (detailing a new project to ensure
teachers are uniformly qualified). The Office of Social Sector Development is also working
with the MoE to develop a teacher registration database and more uniform recruitment practices. Additionally, the Capacity Development Project is working with the MoE to develop
forgery proof paper for the printing of authentic diplomas. Id.
105
See generally UNCAC, supra note 53, arts. 15–44 (providing for the criminalization of
acts of corruption and necessary law enforcement mechanisms).
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official and the solicitation or acceptance of a bribe by a public official,
which Afghanistan has done.106 However, corruption is so widespread and
accepted that merely criminalizing it is not a complete solution. For
example, wealthier citizens often bribe police officers and judges, avoiding
any criminal sanctions and only serving to enhance the problem.107 For
Afghanistan’s anti-corruption agenda to be successful, it must bridge the
gap between prevention and law enforcement. This stage is critical and
should include a strong up-front component to establish credibility
immediately.
Afghanistan’s current anti-corruption legislation is based on the
Afghan Constitution, UNCAC, the Afghanistan National Development
Strategy (ANDS), and the Strategy and Policy for Anti-Corruption and
Administrative Reform (SPACAR).108 Unfortunately, Afghanistan’s laws,
investigative procedures, and enforcement regulations overlap and are
difficult to decipher.109 In December 2010, the Director-General of
HOOAC, Mohammad Yasin Osmani, announced that the Afghan
government was working to further revise the country’s anti-corruption laws
to better comply with UNCAC.110
ANDS and SPACAR require the government to focus on reducing
administrative corruption by increasing monitoring, introducing additional
programs to limit the risk of corruption, and enhancing public interaction
and complaint capabilities.111 Both focus on the underlying causes of
106

Id. art. 15(a)–(b).
UN Afghanistan Survey Points to Huge Scale of Bribery, BBC NEWS (Jan. 10, 2009),
http://news.bbc.c o.uk / 2/hi/8466915.stm.
108
See CORRUPTION ASSESSMENT, supra note 29, at 16–18 (outlining the current legal
foundation in Afghanistan); see also FINALIZED STRATEGY, supra note 52, at 2–3. Article 7
of the Afghan Constitution requires the country’s laws to comply with its international obligations and treaties; Article 75 states the government has the duty to “[maintain] public law
and order and elimination of administrative corruption;” and Article 142 requires the national
government to establish the necessary departments to comply with all provisions of the Constitution. Though it is rare for a constitution to explicitly discuss corruption, Afghanistan’s
Constitution does not go into any depth or provide a framework for the government to combat corruption in any way. CONST. OF AFG. 1392, available at http://www.afghan-web.com/
politics/current_constitution.html.
109
See CORRUPTION ASSESSMENT, supra note 29, at 15–18 (describing the many offices
involved with anti-corruption effort). Currently, complaints regarding corruption are collected at HOOAC or the Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission (corruption falls
under AIHRC’s mandate because it violates human rights). Complaints then must be sorted
to go to the individual ministries, the Attorney General’s Office, or the Afghan National
Police in the Ministry of Interior (all of which are extraordinarily corrupt in and of themselves). The National Directorate of Security, responsible for countering organized crime,
also gathers information and refers it to the Attorney General. Id.
110
SIGAR REP’T, supra note 57, at 108.
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FINALIZED STRATEGY, supra note 52, at 2.
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corruption and advocate for programs and institutional changes outside of
criminalization to transform the perception of corruption and mitigate its
impact.
Still, SPACAR comprehensively details many of the current
deficiencies in the governmental framework for combating corruption, and
it outlines steps to be taken by different government agencies to correct
these deficiencies. However, it also acknowledges that “current laws and
regulations, whether they are previous, translated or new, sometimes do not
conform to the administrative conditions in the country and causes different
types of corruption and chaos in the work process.”112 In the education
system specifically, SPACAR provides little guidance, only requiring the
MoE to include constitutional law for all students in 7th grade and higher,
develop a more efficient system for busing students to school, promote
respect for the justice system, create more transparent procedures for
procurement and construction contracts, and standardize the curriculum and
student forms to allow employers to more easily and accurately identify
students’ qualifications.113
Despite the lack of specificity regarding MoE anti-corruption
programs, SPACAR does offer a number of improvements regarding
Afghanistan’s general anti-corruption strategy that will benefit all anticorruption programs.114 Among these are the recommendations for higher
wages for public employees,115 an increased focus on standards of
professionalism in the public sector,116 new regulations requiring police and
judicial officials to abide by the law when arresting and sentencing
individuals rather than letting individuals off because of connections or the
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SPACAR, supra note 69, at 60.
Id. at 64. Interestingly, though SPACAR does not specifically discuss corruption in the
education sector, it does touch on a number of individual sectors, including courts, health,
transportation, logging, and mining. See generally id.
114
See, e.g., id. at 27, 34– 54, 114– 17 (proposing standards for regulating the influence of
personal relationship, professionalism in the workforce, and government contracting).
115
See id. at 53 (“The salary and retirement allowances for employees should be stabilized
and approved justifiably, this way employees will never prefer another job over than their
current job due to lack of salary.”).
116
See id. at 90.
The authorities of the Supreme Court should make an assessment of the qualifications, experience and competence of the judicial professional staff, both in the center and as well as in the provinces, and should take legal steps in regard to judges
and judicial staff whose employment is in contradiction with judicial rules and regulations.
Id.
113
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ability to pay a bribe,117 and provisions promoting accountability within the
government.118
While these provisions are beneficial, it is necessary to go further.
Criminalizing the payment and receipt of a bribe will help by punishing the
activity, but it is important to have additional punitive measures available. If
every person who requested, received, offered or paid a bribe were jailed or
fined for their crime, then many—if not most—of the country’s inhabitants
would be imprisoned and bankrupt. Additionally, there is concern that with
the influx of corruption cases, Afghanistan’s courts would be unable to
handle the increased workload. The U.S. Department of Justice is currently
working with Afghan courts and the Anti-Corruption Tribunal to increase
their efficiency and effectiveness when dealing with these cases.119
However, it could also serve the MoE well to have internal sanctions
outside of the court system. For example, the MoE and its anti-corruption
body should consider alternative punishments, including non-penal
sanctions, to punish and condemn the behavior. These measures could
include a fine, but they should also include more creative techniques,
including public censure in the local media, transfer to a different school, or
unpaid suspension for a number of days.120 Theoretically, a teacher who is
publicly reprimanded for requesting a bribe from one student would be
more reluctant to continue requesting bribes from other students. While
monetary sanctions are often successful, Afghanistan’s traditional village
hierarchy makes it less likely that some students will report teachers. For
this reason, the Afghan government should continue to educate the public
117

See id. at 69 (“The Police must be rewarded in accordance with Their [sic] every good
and acceptable action, which shows their devotion and self-sacrifice, and must be legally
prosecuted for every bad action. Paying no attention the implementation of reward and punishment principles, shows the administration is not giving good over site [sic].”)
118
See SPACAR, supra note 69, at 22 (“If such job recommendations and Wastas (connections) are not prevented, the opportunity for transparency and accountability to prevent corruption will never be provided.”).
119
See generally SIGAR REP’T, supra note 57 (detailing the relationship between the United States and Afghanistan in this capacity).
120
Cf. Jamie Sarrio, State Panel to Consider Lighter Punishment for Educators Who Cooperated in Cheating Probe, ATLANTA J. CONST. (Sept. 7, 2011), http://www.ajc.com/news/
atlanta/state-panel-to-consider-1161669.html.
Commissioners, relying extensively on evidence from the state investigation, will
look into each case and decide over the next few months whether the educators
named in the report are guilty of cheating or other ethical violations. Those found
guilty could face sanctions ranging from a reprimand to loss of a teaching license.
Id. Suspending a teacher could cause quite a dilemma, as it would leave a number of students
unable to attend school or require them to work with another teacher. However, suspensions
could be more appropriate for students and officials within the Ministry, as it would serve as
immediate punishment but could also serve to embarrass among peers, and thus as a future
deterrent.

870

CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L.

[Vol. 44:847

and embarrass those caught engaging in corruption, making the act morally
reprehensible and creating an additional deterrent.
Additionally, keeping the investigation, prosecution, and
punishment solely within the MoE would allow the anti-corruption body to
see the case through to its resolution. In doing so, it would prevent further
corruption in the courtroom and would ensure that justice is done in each
case. As discussed above, Afghanistan’s justice system is not known for its
integrity, but keeping cases inside the MoE would mitigate the potential for
additional corruption once a case goes to the courts and would presumably
lessen the expense and time to complete a case. There is a point, however, at
which only so much can be done, and the MoE would need to set clear lines
for when cases shall be bound over to the court system for more severe
punishment.
C.

International Cooperation: Joining Forces to Fight Corruption

International cooperation is the third pillar of UNCAC.121 This
section requires parties to assist each other in criminal matters and to
provide “the widest measure of mutual legal assistance” in investigations,
prosecutions, and judicial proceedings.122
Afghanistan is at an interesting point in its history and has a unique
opportunity to take advantage of the international presence within its
borders. If it chooses to do so, Afghanistan can benefit from unprecedented
international collaboration, which would provide the country with logistical
and mentoring support on issues ranging from security to mining
technology to development projects. Years from now, Afghanistan could be
the model for experts to look to when developing international cooperation
strategies because of the vast number of organizations willing to provide
assistance. Currently, international governmental and non-governmental
organizations are providing assistance with anti-corruption strategies, from
drafting legislation to aiding investigations to furthering education.123 For
example, an American multi-agency group based at the U.S. Embassy in
Kabul, Afghanistan has drafted an additional anti-corruption strategy for the
Afghan government to improve transparency and accountability.124 Despite
the international presence, Afghan citizens must own the anti-corruption
121

See generally UNCAC, supra note 53, arts. 43–49 (detailing the role of international
cooperation in anti-corruption efforts).
122
Id. arts. 43, 46. The Convention also has a significant section detailing extraditions and
transfers between state parties. Id. arts. 44, 45.
123
See CORRUPTION ASSESSMENT, supra note 29, at 1–2 (listing the U.S. agencies currently
pursuing anti-corruption efforts in Afghanistan).
124
FINALIZED STRATEGY, supra note 52, at ii. This strategy has not yet been approved by
the U.S. State Department. Id.
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agenda; without political and moral will, no anti-corruption plan can
succeed. However, international organizations and individuals can play key
roles in this development.125
To do so, however, it is important for U.S. and European agencies
to work alongside Afghan officials in investigating and prosecuting Afghans
at all levels, including those in President Karzai’s national government.
Following the arrest of one of his aides, President Karzai introduced
legislation allowing only Afghan investigators to make decisions regarding
corruption cases.126 In response, President Obama met with his national
security advisors in mid-September 2010 to formulate new ways to combat
corruption in Karzai’s administration.127 In January, the Obama
administration announced that the U.S. government would no longer pursue
top Afghan officials, conceding that “limited judicial capacity and political
pressure” make prosecution nearly impossible.128 Though this would
undermine the application and legitimacy of some anti-corruption measures,
125

Many governments and NGOs are currently providing assistance with anti-corruption
initiatives. For example, USAID has conducted comprehensive reviews regarding the extent
of corruption within Afghanistan and the country’s current anti-corruption laws. See generally CORRUPTION ASSESSMENT, supra note 29. In addition, they have provided assistance with
various programs, including the printing of diplomas on forgery-proof paper. Id. at 19. The
Federal Bureau of Investigation has provided expertise and assistance with anti-corruption
investigations and prosecutions, and international legal experts have provided guidance to
ensure that Afghanistan’s laws comply with UNCAC and achieve the stated goals. Id. at 20,
32.
126
See Rajiv Chandrasekaran, Karzai Seeks to Limit Role of U.S. Corruption Investigators ,
WASH. POST (Sept. 9, 2010), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/
09/08/AR2010090805935_pf.html. An Afghan task force that received financing, training,
equipment, and intelligence from the FBI and other U.S. law enforcement agencies made the
arrest of Karzai’s aide. Following Karzai’s statement, advisors from the U.S. Department of
Justice temporarily suspended their work with the Afghan anti-corruption unit. While there is
concern among the Obama administration that the American assistance is creating a rift with
Karzai, one U.S. official hinted at the importance of the investigations to the Afghan public,
saying, “The Afghans want to see their leaders held to account. They don’t want these cases
swept under the rug.” Rajiv Chandrasekaran, Karzai Rift Prompts U.S. to Reevaluate AntiCorruption Strategy in Afghanistan, WASH. POST (Sept. 13, 2010) [hereinafter U.S. to
Reevaluate], http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/09/12/AR201009
1203883.html.
127
U.S. to Reevaluate, supra note 126. In addition to calling for new legislation, Karzai
intervened and ordered his aide, Mohammad Zia Salehi, released from custody. The Afghan
government subsequently dropped all charges against Salehi. Warren P. Strobel & Marisa
Taylor, U.S. Won’t Pursue Karzai Allies in Anti-Corruption Campaign, MCCLATCHY
NEWSPAPERS (Jan. 6, 2011), http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2011/01/06/106314/afghan-anticorruption-plan-sidesteps.html.
128
Strobel & Taylor, supra note 127. The strategy does not completely rule out pursuing
top Afghan officials, saying the U.S. government may be compelled to act unilaterally if the
Afghan government fails to act by freezing officials’ assets or limiting travel to the United
States. Id.
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it is a practical resolution: pursuing President Karzai’s allies would be
fruitless and would only serve to frustrate the current partnership between
the U.S. and Afghan government. Instead, Obama’s new anti-corruption
plan targets corruption at the local level and fortifies Afghan institutions.129
This strategy could be very successful in the MoE, as many of the
individuals engaging in corruption in the education sector are low-level
officials and civil servants whom the Afghan government will not protect.
Afghanistan is sovereign and reserves the right to make its own
decisions regarding corruption, but it is critical at this stage that U.S. and
other international agencies be permitted to assist in these lower-level
investigations and prosecutions. Not only would this allow Afghanistan to
use more modern techniques, but also it would assure a level of credibility
and accountability that might otherwise be absent in an all-Afghan
organization. Additionally, foreign agencies could provide the necessary
manpower required until the MoE’s anti-corruption body can fully recruit
and train its own anti-corruption agents.
Although Afghan officials will largely decide the extent of any
international assistance, the international community could take direct steps
to influence President Karzai’s decisions. The most obvious and effective
technique would be to withhold aid, both monetary and otherwise. If
President Karzai or MoE officials were to refuse to allow American law
enforcement agencies to assist—as they have—the clearest condemnation
the Obama administration could convey would be to withhold money. Since
2002, the U.S. government has allocated roughly $50 billion for
reconstruction assistance in Afghanistan; an additional $20 billion has been
pledged.130 In the past decade, the education sector has received 9% of the
total aid, but that number has decreased with respect to just the past seven
years, for which education has received the least amount of aid of any
government sector.131 With a decrease in provided aid, it might seem unwise
to discontinue funding, particularly for education.
However, numerous studies, including the Azimi Report, which was
produced by the Inter-Institutional Commission on Corruption, have found
that the unprecedented large inflows of international assistance have led to
pressures to commit and spend the money quickly and have greatly
129

Id. The plan states: “The goals of this strategy are to strengthen Afghan institutions to
provide checks on government power, to positively influence the behavior of corrupt officials, and to tackle visible corruption (especially at the local level) so that the Afghan people
can see that change is happening.” Id.
130
FINALIZED STRATEGY, supra note 52, at ii.
131
Id. The infrastructure/natural resources and agriculture sectors received the most aid,
with 24% and 18% respectively. Governance, operating budget assistance, economic governance, social protection, education, and health complete the remaining sectors in descending
order of aid provided. Id.
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increased the opportunities for corruption.132 Withholding funds not only
limits the amount of money that can be corruptly distributed, but it also
encourages the government to ensure that the money is used as effectively
as possible. With so many funds disappearing or prices rising because of
corruption, the continuing inflow of significant financial assistance will
only continue to feed a corrupt system.
Most recently, in a course-changing and risky move, the Obama
administration’s anti-corruption strategy pledged not to withhold funds, but
to funnel hundreds of millions of dollars directly to individual ministries
and municipalities.133 While this plan circumvents the extra hand of the
Afghan national government, it could be effective if the money is carefully
distributed and monitored. In addition to money donated to the MoE for the
funding of teachers, school buildings, and books, the U.S. government and
international allies should ensure that a substantial portion flows to the
independent anti-corruption body to continue uncovering corruption within
the Ministry. To satisfy governmental and non-governmental donors,
Afghanistan and its international partners should simplify the auditing
procedures within each Ministry and sector, ensuring that all money is
accounted for. Any anti-corruption plan that continues to fund development
projects will likely fail if it does not also strengthen anti-corruption
organizations responsible for monitoring those projects and ministries.134
D.

Asset Recovery: The Cost of Corruption

Asset recovery is the final pillar of UNCAC.135 Theoretically, this
provision requires the government to confiscate corrupt funds from the
perpetrator and to return those funds to their rightful owner. It relies on the
notion that anti-corruption reform will succeed if it can create a widespread
sense of justice and the faith that corruption does not pay. In order to
succeed, the fruits of the crime must be taken away and returned to the
rightful party.
However, the type of corruption that is occurring within the
education sector is not as sophisticated or severe as the Convention seems to
intend. For example, UNCAC requires that a state “[t]ake such measures as
132

CORRUPTION ASSESSMENT, supra note 29, at 5.
Strobel & Taylor, supra note 127.
134
Should it strengthen its auditing policies, Afghanistan would also likely benefit from
increased donor aid from non-governmental organizations, as many organizations remain
reluctant to donate out of a fear that the money will be re-distributed or “lost.” Aunohita
Mojumdar, Afghanistan: Donor Funding Missing Mark, EURASIANET (Dec. 28, 2010),
http://www.eurasianet.org/node/62640.
135
See generally UNCAC, supra note 53, arts. 51–59. This aspect of the Convention is
considered a breakthrough in the international anti-corruption field, but is not particularly
applicable to the MoE.
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may be necessary to permit its competent authorities to give effect to an
order of confiscation issued by a court of another State Party…”136 But
international corruption is not the type of corruption that the education
sector is wrought with. When a teacher demands a bribe, the student’s family pays the bribe and there is little involvement with banks, a network of
people, or international connections.
Afghanistan should ensure that its laws and regulations comply with
UNCAC, but the sophistication of the Convention’s asset-recovery
provisions require do not apply to all forms of corruption in Afghanistan,
particularly within the MoE.137 Because of this, Afghanistan should focus on
requiring repayment of bribes in the criminalization aspect of its reform,
ensuring that part of the punishment for bribery includes returning the
funds.
V. CONCLUSION
The detrimental effects of corruption on the education sector in
Afghanistan are vast, overwhelming, and discouraging. But they are
problems that a society—particularly one that has been in the midst of
conflict for the better part of fifty years—should expect to face. The steps
that Afghanistan has already taken in the education sector are encouraging.
From increasing teacher salaries and implementing direct-deposit systems,
to more comprehensive and rigorous information gathering, investigation,
and prosecution of corruption, Afghanistan’s MoE has and must continue to
make progress in the months and years ahead. However, for any real change
to occur, national and MoE officials must be willing to commit significant
resources to the recruitment and training of individuals to fill a narrowly
focused and highly visible MoE anti-corruption body.
Corruption in Afghanistan will never disappear, just as it will never
be eradicated in any country. However, Afghanistan can reduce corruption
to a manageable level by working with the international community. When
that happens, the education system will become stronger, as will the rest of
Afghanistan.
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Id. art. 54, ¶ 1(a).
The UNCAC’s asset recovery provisions apply more appropriately to international
actors working within the state, specifically NGOs and government contractors.
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